

Anti-Hoax Election Prebunking Training and Campaign for Novice Voters

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Abstract: The 2024 general elections in Indonesia encounter the issue of a significant number of novice voters as the main consumers of social media, making them susceptible to hoaxes. On that basis, approaches are needed to reduce the possibility of exposure to hoaxes through prebunking. Training in Prebunking Classes and Prebunking Campaigns was held to form antibodies among novice voters to increase resistance to exposure to misinformation, disinformation, and misinformation circulating ahead of the 2024 Election. This training, in collaboration with the anti-hoax organization Mafindo Banjarmasin, took place concurrently on Thursday, October 05, 2023, with 320 participants. The training sessions utilized the PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) approach and were segmented into three stages, which were: (1) the initial stage involved coordinating activities between the campus and Mafindo Banjarmasin regarding the implementation of activities; (2) the implementation stage, Prebunking Class activities were divided into four sessions with topics such as mapping disinformation and misinformation narratives, analyzing the anatomy of information manipulation, prebunking theory and strategies, and producing prebunking content. Meanwhile, the Prebunking Campaign activities were carried out by playing the Ular Tangga boardgame, which contained quizzes and tips on anticipating hoaxes; and (3) the last stage evaluated the effectiveness of the training through pretest and post-test examinations, along with feedback from participants. The outcome of the activity involved increased empowerment among novice voters in recognizing different election hoaxes and acquiring a better understanding of manipulative information tactics. Armed with this knowledge, the training instills stronger resistance strategies against exposure to election hoaxes in novice voters.

Keywords: hoaxes; novice voters; prebunking; prebunking campaigns; training;

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INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian people's commemoration of the 2024 simultaneous elections serves a critical role in preserving a nation's democratic values. In the context of the 2024 elections in Indonesia, the Millennial Generation (born 1981–1996) and Generation Z (born 1997–2012) are significant components and play a strategic role in the sustainability of the country's democracy by providing new vitality and perspectives.

The KPU confirmed that the majority of voters in the 2024 elections are young individuals or novice voters, with a percentage of over half, or 56.45% of the total number of voters. The total number of permanent voters in the 2024 elections was 204,807,222, as indicated by the recapitulation of results from the determination of the DPT (Permanent Voters List) by the district/city KPU and PPLN (Overseas Election Committee). The total number of voters from the younger generation was 113,622,550 individuals (KPU RI, 2023; Muhamad, 2023; Ramadhan, 2023). The number of DPT electors has increased by approximately 12 million compared to the DPT for the 2019 elections, which was 192,866,254. The total number of voters in the DPT was 42,843,792, with 17,501,278 individuals aged 20 and 42,843,792 individuals aged 21 to 30 (Rakhmatulloh, 2019).

In Indonesia, the dynamics of shifting demographic forces in political participation are reflected in the joint involvement of the Millennial Generation and Generation Z in this electoral process, which is considered to have a very significant role in the implementation and final results of the 2024 election (Indonesiabaik.id, 2023). The participation of these two generations is not limited to their function as novice voters; they also serve as agents of political information dissemination and conveyors, which contribute to the integrity and efficiency

of the democratization process (KPU RI, 2023). The 2024 elections are crucial for these two generations to participate in, as they possess a substantial population, innovative ideas, dissatisfaction with the status quo, and an intention to contribute to the country's development.

By actively engaging in the 2024 elections through the internet, particularly through online media and social media, which serve as their primary communication channels, Millennials and Generation Z have the potential to influence changes in political dynamics substantially. Consequently, the 2024 generation- Consequently, the 2024 general election acts as a catalyst for establishing a political agenda more in line with the preferences of Generation Z and the Millennial Generation. Additionally, the election is regarded as a critical period for political parties and related organizations to engage with the community (Hayati, 2023). Thus, in the 2024 elections, Millennials and Generation Z interact to establish novel dynamics in the political landscape, thereby influencing the future of a democracy that is both inclusive and pertinent.

Social media serves as an avenue for novice voters to obtain political information, according to data from the Katadata Insight Centre (Rainer, 2023). The social media platforms they primarily rely on are Instagram, Facebook, X/Twitter, TikTok, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram, Line, and others, with the maximum percentage being over 50%. Most Generation Z spend over three hours per day on social media, with an attention span of approximately eight seconds, regarding usage patterns (Evita, 2023; Hasya, 2023).

Generation Z typically utilizes social media to seek entertainment, which results in their consumption of political information as an incidental consequence rather than a deliberate pursuit of such information. This presents a challenge for

election organizers and related parties to convey political information in an engaging and humorous manner to dispel the perception that politics is a dull subject. The initial step in enhancing Generation Z's political literacy may involve consuming political content that quickly garners attention. In contrast, excessively dense content may result in losing their interest (Evita, 2023). Research results (Evita et al., 2023) indicate that Generation Z undergoes a sequence of information search stages in order to access political information in online media and social media. This procedure commences with the acquisition of political information from social media platforms. Subsequently, the accuracy of the information is validated through the internet or search engines, and online media sites identified through previous search results are accessed and connected to various other websites.

This brief attention span for social media access also factors into Generation Z's decision to explore political information in greater depth or disregard it. Gen Z's exposure to content that contains false information or hoaxes can be a double-edged sword. Hoaxes can be interpreted as misinformation, disinformation, or even misinformation resulting from the processing or incapacity to verify data prior to its dissemination by specific parties (Evita, 2023; Evita et al., 2023).

The broad distribution of political news and information through online media and social media necessitates those individuals, particularly Generation Z, who are new electors, exercise caution regarding the potential for hoaxes to prevent confusion and misinformation. The dissemination of hoaxes on the internet can result in injury, unrest, and negative consequences, including the erosion of public morality and the disruption and weakening of democracy. Additionally, hoaxes have

the potential to exacerbate polarisation within the country, lower the quality of political information, and undermine political ideology (Febriansyah Putra & Patra, 2023; Pusiknas Polri, 2022; Wulandari & Mahadewi, 2024; Yunas et al., 2023).

It is becoming increasingly important to comprehend the mechanisms and reasons behind the dissemination of hoaxes on the internet, particularly when we examine the hoax data identified by Kominfo's AIS Team. This team is authorized to scour, identify, verify, and validate all internet content disseminated in Indonesia's cyberspace, including the tracking of hoaxes.

A significant increase in the potential for disseminating fraudulent information that could affect political perceptions and attitudes was observed during the 2019 elections, with 3,356 hoaxes being identified. During the presidential and legislative elections in April 2019, the number of hoaxes reached its greatest point, totalling 501 (Kominfo, 2019). The Mastel survey identified seven types of hoaxes that were prevalent during the 2019 elections. These included (1) hoaxes in the form of writings, which accounted for up to 70.7 percent of the total; (2) edited photos, which accounted for 57.8 percent; (3) photos with fake captions, which accounted for 66.3 percent of the total; (4) fake voiceover videos, which accounted for 32.2 percent of the total; (5) video pieces, which accounted for 45.7 percent; (6) fake captioned videos, which accounted for 53.2% of the total; and (7) hoaxes in the form of old news, photos, or videos that were re-distributed, which accounted for 69.2 percent of the total (Umabaihi, 2023; Wedhaswary, 2023).

According to Kominfo (2023), there were just ten election hoaxes in 2022, according to its Press Release Number 422/HM/KOMINFO/10/2023. But from July 17 to November 26, 2023, Kemkominfo discovered 355 social

media posts about the 2024 election that contained 96 falsehoods. Monitoring these fictitious data may impact the dynamics and public opinion of the electoral process. The information reveals the quantity of hoaxes in circulation and highlights any possible risks.

Political branding and campaigns are conducted on social media (Hasanuddin et al., 2021). One of the modifications to campaign laws that have taken place after the 2017 elections is the acknowledgement of social media as a tool for campaigns (Monggilo, 2023). Regulators now in place cannot address the threat of various campaign issues in the age of political disruption that emerges on social media, such as MDM (misinformation, disinformation, and misinformation), in the lead-up to the election. Furthermore, incomplete or nonexistent knowledge of the voting process, particularly among inexperienced voters, poses additional dangers in the form of knowledge gaps for creating MDM distribution routes (CIS Agency, 2021).

As a result, it is imperative to implement preventative measures to prevent the severe threat posed by the diverse array of political hoaxes circulated before the 2024 elections. This hazard can be mitigated by taking a proactive approach known as prebunking or hoax-sensing. Harjani et al. (2022) claim that prebunking is a medical concept derived from William McGuire's Inoculation Theory. Preventive resistance to misinformation is established through this method, which functions as a "vaccine" that generates antibodies to misinformation prior to its dissemination. As a result, audiences who receive prebunking injections will develop resistance to exposure to a variety of information disorders, including MDM.

Prebunking in relation to elections is paramount, as the public, particularly

novice voters, requires precise information to evaluate candidates objectively. This challenge necessitates the active involvement of the community, government agencies, and educational institutions, in addition to the responsibility of election organizers. This is undoubtedly done to mitigate the adverse consequences of the dissemination of hoaxes and preserve the integrity of democracy.

In order to mitigate the potential for conflict and nationwide division, parties must collaborate to address various election threats, including polarization, SARA issues, and delegitimization of elections. As a preventive measure, prebunking efforts can be prioritized to initiate collaboration through training activities. Considering the need for more knowledge and skills in executing fact-checking and prebunking activities, the training was arranged. Therefore, participants are anticipated to possess sufficient knowledge and abilities, provided they are actively engaged.

Therefore, the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Lambung Mangkurat University Banjarmasin collaborates and synergizes with the anti-hoax organization, Mafindo Banjarmasin region, to provide training activities to novice voters in the form of prebunking classes and prebunking campaigns. These activities are conducted through simple, interactive, and entertaining methods. To mitigate their vulnerability to hoaxes, novice voters should be instructed in identifying and comprehending various manipulative information strategies and techniques, utilizing the knowledge acquired from prebunking training.

METHOD

Generally, the prebunking training activity, or hoax perception, is divided into two activities: the prebunking class and the prebunking campaign, which employ the PRA (participatory rural

appraisal) method or active participation of participants. As subjects, this approach encourages them to engage in the roles of researchers, administrators, and program implementers. Empowerment, program development, and participant engagement in development activities are all critical components of this participation (Lestari et al., 2021; Putri et al., 2022). Lestari et al. (2021) apply the PRA method's principles, which include critical awareness, personal responsibility, sharing, and how they do it in the prebunking class and prebunking campaign (Chambers, 1994).

All activities were executed face-to-face on Thursday, October 5, 2023. Located at the Hall Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Lambung Mangkurat University, the Prebunking Campaign activity commences at 08.00 WITA and concludes at 12.30 WITA. A total of 272 participants are expected to participate. In the meantime, the Prebunking Class, which encompassed 48 participants, commenced at 09.00 WITA and concluded at 12.00 WITA at the Lecture Theater Building of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Lambung Mangkurat University Banjarmasin. This training activity was organized into three phases: preparation, implementation, and evaluation.

The pretest and post-test results were compared on the LMS (Learning Management System) platform during the evaluation phase of the Prebunking Class. Prior to participating in the Prebunking Class activities, the pretest was administered to assess the participants' initial understanding of prebunking. Subsequently, the post-test was administered to evaluate the participants' knowledge following a class session. The LMS could access the same ten multiple-choice questions on prebunking for both the pretest and post-test. The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) and the Indonesian Cyber Media Association (AMSI)

collaborated to devise all questions for the cekfakta.com program.

In the interim, the prebunking campaign was executed by employing the Snakes and Ladders board game as an anti-hoax campaign medium. The game comprised 14 pieces of information in the form of statements, tips, and four quiz questions regarding prebunking. The evaluation results were derived from the number of participants who effectively answered the quiz questions in the game and from their testimonials.

The analysis was conducted by examining the number of correct and incorrect answers that participants obtained in the pretest and post-test. The participant's account on the LMS page was used to automatically display the number of correct answers from the pretest and post-test.

Table 1 Participants in classroom training and prebunking campaigns

Activity	Number of Participants
Prebunking Campaign	272 people
Prebunking Class	48 people
TOTAL	320 people

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Hoaxes can be defined as information that is inaccurate, false, and has the potential to obfuscate the truth. Hoaxes are untruths presented as truth by an individual who can influence the public through entertainment and has the power to do so (Finneman & Thomas, 2018; Utami, 2018).

Hoaxes represent a significant threat to the long-term viability of truthful and accurate information in the tough digital age. As a result, novel approaches to preventing the spread of hoaxes must be implemented before they reach dangerous proportions. Prebunking is a preventative strategy that can be implemented before people, particularly novice voters, are exposed to hoaxes.

Prebunking works not only to uncover manipulative communications but also to oppose them before they proliferate. According to Monggilo (2023), prebunking aims to highlight the development of individuals' talents, both rationally and psychologically, to identify authentic news from fake news before falling victim to misinformation. In line with this, Harjani et al. (2022) defined prebunking as a strategy that focuses on how people are manipulated and misled by online information, empowering them to spot manipulation tactics.

Prebunking Class

The objective of hoaxes is to sway the public by targeting various individuals. The primary objective of disseminating forgeries is to craft desired perceptions, manipulate public opinion, and occasionally evaluate the cognitive abilities and accuracy of internet and social media users through a meticulous and strategically planned approach. Although hoaxes are disseminated for various reasons, they are typically done as entertainment or amusement, to disparage a competitor in the context of a black campaign, to promote something misleadingly, or to persuade individuals to take certain actions without a clear basis.

However, it is important to acknowledge that the dissemination of these hoaxes can initiate a chain reaction in which the individual who receives the hoax becomes motivated to disseminate it to others further. Subsequently, the deception expands rapidly (Beta et al., 2022; Rahadi, 2017; Utami, 2018).

Roozenbeek et al. (2020) propose that prebunking can enhance an individual's mental immune system to false news by exposing them to "weak doses" of it. In this method, a mild dose is regarded as a deliberately attenuated version of manipulation techniques in a "controlled" environment, intending to activate an

individual's psychological immunity system and capture their attention. In summary, prebunking is a method that involves the exposure of individuals to misinformation in order to develop "mental antibodies" against false news.

The following are the five phases and considerations that must be considered when creating prebunking material, as per Harjani et al. (2022): Initially, ascertain the subject of the misinformation you wish to address. Step two is to identify the target audience you wish to address. The third stage in determining the results to be achieved from the prebunking intervention is the determination of the objectives, which are categorized into three areas: knowledge or skills, attitudes, and behaviours. Fourth, select an issue-based approach or technique. Fifth, determine the media format. The prebunking message can be conveyed through various mediums, including text, audio, visual, video, and games.

Participants in the prebunking class are anticipated to possess the ability to comprehend the election disinformation map and comprehend the necessity of prebunking. In addition, this course functions as a training platform for developing prebunking campaign content that can be disseminated as education through social media.

The prebunking class preparation phase commenced with the campus and the Mafindo Banjarmasin region coordinating as the committee and facilitator for the activity's execution. The committee deliberated on various topics, including licensing, the location of the activity, and the intended audience. Next, the process continued with the creation and printing of e-flyers and roll banners and the provision of merchandise and souvenir door rewards for the participants.

Documentation of activities is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 (a) LMS and pretest completion, (b) Submission of the first session material, and (c) Group assignment work

Participants were divided into eight discussion groups during the implementation phase. Additionally, the facilitator instructed the participants to complete the pretest and input the data into the Learning Management System (LMS), as illustrated in Figure 1. The Indonesian Cyber Media Association (AMSI) and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) developed questions regarding prebunking on the pretest page as part of the cekfakta.com program.

This activity was followed by the distribution of prebunking material, divided into four sessions. The content of this session encompasses the categories or foundations of political misinformation and disinformation narratives, their effects, and the potential dissemination of hoaxes during elections. Learning is comprised of three stages: (1) comprehension of misinformation, disinformation, and prebunking; (2) engagement in the role of hoax producers in the development of strategies to combat hoaxes; and (3) practice in the creation of prebunking content.

The second session included material that focused on the dissection of the anatomy of information manipulation. In order to identify political misinformation and disinformation, the participants endeavoured to comprehend the concept of AKTM (actor, content, tactics, and mode). Additionally, the third session addressed the theory and strategy of

prebunking, a method used to limit the rate of information manipulation. The materials presented comprised (1) an introduction to the concept of prebunking, (2) the distinction between prebunking and debunking, (3) the relationship between prebunking and inoculation theory, and (4) strategies for the design of prebunking.

The most recent session focused on prebunking content production, encompassing the seven pillars and three categories of prebunking content: prebunking narratives, prebunking publications, and prebunking content.

These materials are consistent with the measures implemented in the fraud prevention socialization initiatives before the 2024 elections (Hayati, 2023). These stages encompass the following: verifying the authenticity and facts of images or videos, reporting political hoaxes, verifying news sources, and increasing awareness of news titles and content. In the evaluation stage, the comprehension of these materials serves as the basis for evaluation. During this phase, participants were required to accomplish tasks in the LMS in groups in accordance with the material covered in each session (Figure 1b). Participants were required to complete assignments that enhanced their understanding of prebunking prior to and following their exposure to new information.

As part of the first session's evaluation, participants were tasked with mapping misinformation and disinformation from situations previously provided in election-related materials. The mapping classifies confirmation bias, backfire effect, and echo chamber as phenomena currently prevalent in the digital realm ahead of the political year (Yunas et al., 2023).

Furthermore, in accordance with the AKTM idea of political misinformation and deception, participants were invited to analyze and deconstruct incidents during the second session. In the third session, participants were required to complete a group activity relating to hoax content analysis by developing a hoax vaccination. Then, using the materials from the previous session, participants were asked to identify the issues to be monitored. Participants were requested to undertake mini-research to accumulate narratives from diverse sources, such as journals, expert opinions, regulations, and official websites.

Each group then decided on the format for the prebunking information, which may be an article, an infographic, or a video. Nasution et al. (2023) used comparable digital content production training strategies to build political education, encouraging participants to identify content concepts and ideas, perform prior research, use supporting technologies, and plan and execute. The

purpose is for participants to comprehend social media algorithms while demonstrating a fresh spirit of promoting political knowledge among novice voters.

The evaluation of the prebunking class concluded with completing a post-test via the LMS that had questions identical to the pretest and assessed participants' understanding of the prebunking materials and group tasks.

At the start of the implementation and evaluation stages, the 48 Prebunking Class participants were asked the identical ten multiple-choice questions about the prebunking material, each worth 10 points. The pretest and post-test points were immediately presented in each participant's LMS account. These test results enabled participants and organizers to see the difference in points on each assessment and assess participants' knowledge by comparing test points on the LMS, as shown in Figure 2.

The pretest results for all participants in the pre-bunking class ranged from 50 to 70 points, showing that prior to the class, participants did not completely comprehend and understand knowledge about hoaxes and pre-bunking. Meanwhile, the post-test scores varied from 80 to 90. According to these results, participants' understanding increased after attending the pre-bunking class.




Figura 2 Comparison of pretest and post-test scores of new voter participants in the prebunking class

This evaluation enables the identification of information that has yet to be well understood by participants as novice voters, as well as the level of understanding and efficacy of the material delivery. This serves as feedback to the administrators, enabling them to communicate information more effectively during the subsequent event.

The distribution of door prizes and merchandise to the participants concluded this activity, followed by a group photo session between the committee, facilitators, and participants, as illustrated in Figure 3.



Figure 3 Group photo of the organizers, facilitators, and participants of the prebunking class.

The Prebunking Campaign

Similar to the Prebunking Class action, this campaign activity attempts to strengthen novice voters' resilience to election hoaxes in the impending 2024 elections. However, whereas the prebunking class focuses on training participants to comprehend various election hoaxes and empower them to generate prebunking content, the prebunking campaign focuses on raising participants' awareness of election fake news using board games.

More broadly, this campaign aims not only to deliver anti-hoax vaccines to beginner voters to predict and avoid hoaxes but also to teach them prebunking abilities, with the expectation that they will pass on the knowledge obtained early on to other communities. In the early stages, the committee, which is a

combination of campus parties and the Mafindo organization in the Banjarmasin region, began discussing the preparation of activities by determining all activity plans, including targeting audiences, working on implementation needs such as poster design, e-flyers, roll banners, souvenirs, merchandise, boardgame printing, licensing and preparation of activity venues, and sounding activities to faculty of social and political sciences Lambung Mangkurat University. During the implementation stage, participants were invited to play anti-hoax games employing snakes and ladders board games as campaign media (Figure 4).



Figure 4 Snakes and ladders board games

The adoption of this game-based campaign strategy is likely to not only improve participants' ability to recognize bogus news but also build immunity to it. In their experiments, Basol et al. (2020) and Roozenbeek & van der Linden (2019) demonstrated that using games is useful in developing resistance to disinformation.

Before starting the activity, participants were directed to fill out the registration form, either manually or by scanning the provided registration link barcode. Following that, attendees were directed to the Hall Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Lambung Mangkurat University Banjarmasin for a quick lesson on pre-bunking and a review of the regulations for the Snakes and Ladders board game.

Participants were then instructed to listen to all the information columns in the Snakes and Ladders board games, which included quizzes, advice, and information on hoaxes and how to prevent them. To play the board games,

the participants were separated into three groups. Figure 5 depicts a Snakes and Ladders board game with around 10-20 participants, each getting one chance to play. One round of the game might last approximately 20 minutes.



(a)



(b)

Figura 5 Participants of the prebunking campaign play the Snakes and Ladders board game

The distribution of souvenirs to privileged participants who were able to answer questions or exams while playing board games was indicative of the evaluation stage of the prebunking campaign. A total of 20 participants were able to obtain souvenirs after playing the board games until the final game. In comparison, 200 other participants were able to obtain souvenirs after providing the correct answers. This indicates a high degree of cognizance regarding the identification of hoaxes. The evaluation was also evaluated in accordance with the testimonials provided by the Prebunking Campaign participants. One of the participants in the prebunking campaign expressed his satisfaction with the activity, as it enabled him to become more informed about the hoax news in Indonesia. "I am really happy with today's campaign activities; it feels like I can be more aware of the hoax news in Indonesia."

CONCLUSION

The prebunking training, initiated by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Lambung Mangkurat University and Mafindo Banjarmasin, was divided into two main activities: the prebunking class and the prebunking campaign. In the

Prebunking Class, the material presented was structured into (1) mapping disinformation and misinformation narratives, (2) dissecting the anatomy of information manipulation, (3) prebunking theories and strategies, and (4) prebunking content production. Meanwhile, in the Prebunking Campaign, participants were invited to play the Snakes and Ladders board game series, students against Hoaxes', which contained quizzes and tips for anticipating hoaxes.

The training's success was assessed based on the improvement of the Prebunking Class pretest and post-test scores and testimonials from the Prebunking Campaign participants.

Through this prebunking training activity, students in the category of novice voters became more empowered to identify various election hoaxes and better understand the techniques and tactics of information manipulation. Furthermore, this training also optimizes the resistance strategies of novice voters to election hoaxes. In the future, the training participants are expected to be able to actively transmit the knowledge gained at an early stage to the community, as well as other novice voters.

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